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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
INSURANCE-RIGHT TO PROCEEDS-CLAIM OF REMAINDERMAN UNDER POLICY
TO LIFE TENANT AS ABSOLUTE OWNER-[Missouri].-Defendant issued a
fire insurance policy on real property to cotenants or "their legal repre-
sentatives." Deceased devised a life estate in his interest to his cotenant
with remainder over to the intervenor charitable corporation in fee simple.
A conveyance by the life tenant after testator's death purported to pass
the whole interest in the property to plaintiff who procured a reissuance
of the policy to himself as the assured and paid all assessments on the policy
out of his own funds. A fire destroyed the insured property. The inter-
venor claimed an interest in the proceeds proportional to its vested re-
mainder interest. Held, by the Kansas City Court of Appeals, that the life
tenant and remainderman were to share the proceeds in proportion to their
respective interests in the property destroyed, after the remainderman re-
imbursed the life tenant for its commensurate part of the premiums paid
by him.'
What respective interests do life tenant and remainderman have in the
proceeds of such a policy?2 In the instant case the court adopted the Rhode
Island rule 3 that if the policy covers merely the life tenant's interest, he
is entitled to the full insurance, but he is, after payment of the loss, a
1. Fitterling v. Johnson County Mutual Fire Ins. Co. (Mo. App. 1938)
112 S. W. (2d) 347.
2. In the absence of any express agreement or stipulation in the instru-
ment that created the life estate, the clear majority view is that the pro-
ceeds of a fire insurance policy do not replace the destroyed property, when
the life tenant has procured the policy. Leeds v. Cheetham (Ch. 1827) 57
Eng. Rep. 533; Kearney v. Kearney (1864) 17 N. J. Eq. 59; Suffolk Fire
Ins. Co. v. Boyden (1864) 91 Mass. 123; Rayner v. Preston (1881) L. R.
18 Ch. Div. 1, 50 L. J. Ch. N. S. 472, 44 L. T. N. S. 787; International
Trust Co. v. Boardman (1889) 149 Mass. 158, 21 N. E. 239; Addis v. Addis
(1891) 14 N. Y. S. 657; Harrison v. Pepper (1896) 166 Mass. 288, 44 N. E.
222, 33 L. R. A. 239, 55 Am. St. Rep. 404; Spaulding v. Miller (1898) 103
Ky. 405, 45 S. W. 944; Blanchard v. Kingston (1923) 222 Mich. 631, 193
N. W. 241; Thompson v. Gearheart (1923) 137 Va. 427, 119 S. E. 67, 37
A. L. R. 36; Clark v. Leverett (1925) 159 Ga. 487, 126 S. E. 258, 37 A. L. R.
180; Underwood v. Fortune (Mo. App. 1928) 9 S. W. (2d) 845; King v.
King (1932) 163 Miss. 584, 143 So. 422; Corder v. McDougall (1933) 216
Calif. 773, 16 P. (2d) 740; Fitterling v. Johnson County Mutual Fire Ins.
Co. (Mo. App. 1938) 112 S. W. (2d) 347. As early as 1729 Lord Chan-
cellor King, in Lynch v. Dalzell (1729) 2 Eng. Rep. 292, held that a con-
tract of insurance was a personal contract which inured to the benefit of
the person to whom the contract was made and by whom the premiums
were paid. This was quoted with approval by Story, J., in Columbia In-
surance Co. of Alexandria v. Lawrence (1829) 35 U. S. 507, 9 L. ed. 512.
Some courts have held that such a contract is one to indemnify the insured
against loss or damage, and not someone else not a party to the contract.
Thompson v. Gearheart (1923) 137 Va. 427, 119 S. E. 67. It is the general
consensus among American courts that insurance is a personal contract
and does not attach to the res subject to the risk. Sanders v. Armstrong
(1901) 22 Ky. L. Rep. 1789, 61 S. W. 700. However, apportionment has
been applied where the contract of insurance preceded the life tenant's
occupation. Haxall v. Shippen (1839) 37 Va. 536, 34 Am. Dec. 745; Graham
v. Roberts (1851) 41 N. C. Eq. Rep. 99.
3. Sampson v. Grogan (1899) 21 R. I. 174, 42 A. 712, 44 L. R. A. 711.
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trustee for the remainderman as to the excess received over the value of
his life interest. 4 To that extent the court adapted the doctrine of Ridge
v. The Home Life Insurance Co.,5 in which the St. Louis Court of Appeals
held that as between a life tenant and a reversioner, the life tenant, al-
though insuring the fee, is entitled to recover for only his interest in the
property at the date of the loss, and the balance of the fund is to be paid
to the reversioner. In Millard v. Beaumont6 the Springfield Court of Ap-
peals extended the rule of the Ridge case to the situation where loss oc-
curred after the death of a devisor who had insured the property. The same
court in Underwood v. Fortune7 reached a different result. The court held
that unless required by contrary terms in the instrument creating the
estate or in some agreement of the life tenant, the latter, who insures the
property as a whole, is entitled to the entire proceeds of the policy payable
to him and cannot be held accountable to the remainderman for such money,
even if it exceeds the value of the life tenant's interest and is equal to the
whole value of the property destroyed. This rule, commonly known as the
Massachusetts doctrine,s is based on the theory that the contract of insur-
ance is a personal contract and inures to the benefit of the party with
whom it is made and by whom the premiums are paid.0 It is a contract
of indemnity against loss.10
There exists still a third rule, the South Carolina doctrine, which holds
that any fire insurance effected by the life tenant is also for the benefit
4. The rationale of the instant case is: Sound public policy requires
that any money collected by a life-tenant on a total loss by fire should
be used in rebuilding, or should go to the remainderman, reserving the in-
terest for life for the life tenant. The latter ought not to be allowed to
put himself in a position in which he would have no motive for proper care
of the estate by having a policy of fire insurance, whereby in case of loss,
he could substitute the full fee-simple value of the buildings in place of his
interest for life. Fitterling v. Johnson County Mutual Fire Ins. Co. (Mo.
App. 1938) 112 S. W. (2d) 347.
5. (1895) 64 Mo. App. 108.
6. (1916) 194 Mo. App. 69, 185 S. W. 547.
7. The court distinguished Ridge v. The Home Life Ins. Co. and Millard
v. Beaumont from this case on the basis that in the latter cases the fire
insurance policy contained the clause "as her interest may appear," where-
as in this case no such clause was in the policy. Under any rule, when the
policy contains such an express restriction upon the interest of the life
tenant in the proceeds of the policy, the courts give effect thereto and limit
the life tenant's payment to his expressed interest in the policy. Underwood
v. Fortune (Mo. App. 1928) 9 S. W. (2d) 845.
8. Harrison v. Pepper (1896) 166 Mass. 288, 44 N. E. 222, 33 L. R. A.
239, 55 Am. St. Rep. 404; Spaulding v. Miller (1898) 103 Ky. 405, 45 S. W.
944; Thompson v. Gearheart (1923) 137 Va. 427, 119 S. E. 67, 37 A. L. R.
36; Clark v. Leverett (1925) 159 Ga. 487, 126 S. E. 258, 37 A. L. R. 180;
Underwood v. Fortune (Mo. App. 1928) 9 S. W. (2d) 845; King v. King
(1932) 163 Miss. 584, 143 So. 422; Corder v. McDougall (1933) 216 Calif.
773, 16 P. (2d) 740.
9. Finney v. Fair Haven Ins. Co. (1842) 46 Mass. 192, 38 Am. Dec. 397;
Brewster v. Warner (1883) 136 Mass. 57, 49 Am. Rep. 5.
10. Wilson v. Hill (1841) 44 Mass. 66; King v. State Mut. Fire Ins.
(1851) 61 Mass. 1; Lerow v. Wilmarth (1864) 91 Mass. 382.
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of the remainderman," and any money collected by him from a total loss
by fire should be used in rebuilding, or should go to the remainderman,
reserving the interest for life to the life tenant and crediting him with the
premium paid.12 Although there is no obligation on the life tenant to
insure, where he does take out insurance, a duty rests on him to protect
and insure the remainderman's interest, apparently on the theory that
failure to do so would be waste.' 3
The court here viewed the reissuance 14 of the policy to the plaintiff life
tenant and payment of premiums by him as having created a new insur-
11. The reason given is that the relation of a life tenant to a remainder-
man is that of a trustee. It is not necessary that the relationship should
be that of an express trust. It may be only that of a quasi trust inasmuch
as the duty to preserve and protect the estate in remainder to the remainder-
man is to a certain extent a fiduciary one and has frequently been termed
an implied or quasi trusteeship. Clark v. Leverett (1925) 159 Ga. 487, 126
S. E. 258.
12. Clyburn v. Reynolds (1889) 31 S. C. 91, 9 S. E. 975; Welsh v.
London Assur. Corp. (1892) 151 Pa. 607, 25 Atl. 142, 31 Am. St. Rep. 786;
Green v. Green (1897) 50 S. C. 514, 27 S. E. 952, 62 Am. St. Rep. 846;
Crook v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. (1935) 175 S. C. 42, 178 S. E. 254.
13. If the exercise of ordinary care requires him to insure, his failure
to do so would render him liable to the remainderman at least for damages.
Loss resulting from such negligence would amount to waste. If such waste
was both permissive and voluntary and was committed in a manner evi-
dencing an utter disregard of the rights of the remainderman, the life
tenant would forfeit his estate. Parker v. Chambliss (1852) 12 Ga. 235;
Roby v. Newton (1904) 121 Ga. 679, 49 S. E. 694; Grimm v. Grimm (1922)
153 Ga. 655, 113 S. E. 91. The fact that the life tenant, acting in his own
behalf, insured this property for his own benefit would indicate that he
thought it prudent to insure and is persuasive that the ordinary care of a
prudent man for the preservation and protection of this property required
him to insure for the benefit of the remainderman as well as himself. Clark
v. Leverett (1925) 159 Ga. 487, 126 S. E. 258. The power of a court of
equity to enjoin the life tenant from committing waste is based upon the
principle that the tenant is considered in the nature of a trustee for those
in remainder. Smith v. Daniel (1827) 2 S. C. 143, 16 Am. Dec. 641.
14. In the instant case, the court viewed the reissuance of the policy
as new insurance by the life tenant, even though the proceeds were pay-
able as of the date of the reissuance. It neglected to inquire into the actual
legal effect of a reissuance, in view of the fact that the policy was originally
issued to the cotenants, the deceased and his brother, and their legal repre-
sentatives, and the plaintiff was named administrator of the estate. An
insurance policy so taken out was held, in Annely v. De Saussure (1887)
26 S. C. 497, 2 S. E. 490, 4 Am. St. Rep. 725, not to inure to the benefit
of the cotenant. One tenant in common is not in any sense a trustee for
his cotenant and has no insurable interest in his share of the property.
The provision for payment to "his legal representatives" strengthens this
construction, and the insurance should pass to the deceased's representative
though his realty passed to his devisees. "As between the beneficiaries of
an estate and the personal representative, a fire policy, payable to insured
and his legal representatives, is personal property, and where loss occurs
after the death of the insured the personal representative is entitled to
collect, unless a different purpose is manifested by the terms of the policy."
Couch, Insurance (1930) sec. 424; Oldham v. Boston Ins. Co. (1920) 189
Ky. 844, 226 S. W. 106, 16 A. L. R. 305.
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ance contract. The instant case, therefore, is in conflict with Underwood v.
Fortune. It clearly adopts the Rhode Island rule, not heretofore followed
in Missouri. Perhaps the equitable viewpoint and sound public policy recog-
nized in recent cases between vendor and purchaser's are preferable. At
any rate the supreme court of this state must now determine whether the
Massachusetts or Rhode Island doctrine shall prevail. S. R. S.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS--BANKRUPTCY-CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-[Fed-
eral].-The National Municipal Bankruptcy Act of 19371 has, unlike the
Act of 1934, been upheld. 2 The new Act, like the old, permits municipalities
to institute voluntary proceedings in courts of bankruptcy. The Lindsay-
Strathmore Irrigation District filed a voluntary petition under the Act,
sufficiently alleging insolvency and other requisite matters. The district
court, feeling bound by Ashton v. Cameron County District,3 which had
declared the Act of 19344 to be invalid, dismissed the petition and declared
the new statute also to be unconstitutional. The United States Supreme
Court in reversing the lower court held the new Act to be neither violative
of the Fifth Amendment nor an unconstitutional interference with the es-
sential sovereignty of the states.
The two acts differ in few respects. The machinery provided in them
is essentially similar. The original Act lumped political subdivisions to-
gether with non-political ones, while the new Act lists them separately.
The Ashton case had declared the earlier Act to be unconstitutional be-
cause the statute applied to political districts and therefore interfered with
the political powers of the State. It was thought by some that separate
listing of the various subdivisions of the state to which the new Act would
apply would allow the courts to circumvent the Ashton case by making use
of the separability clause and thereby declaring the new Act constitutional
as to the non-political subdivisions.5 But the Supreme Court did not dis-
tinguish between the new statute's applicability to political and to non-
political subdivisions. It should be noted further that the Lindsay-Strath-
more Irrigation District had once been held to be a political subdivision by
the Supreme Court of California,6 and federal courts are required to adopt
that interpretation of the district's status.7 The only other substantial
15. Mahan v. The Home Insurance Co. of N. Y. (1920) 205 Mo. App.
592, 226 S. W. 593; Standard Oil Co. v. Dye (1929) 223 Mo. App. 926, 20
S. W. (2d) 946.
1. (1937) 50 Stat. 653, (1937) 11 U. S. C. A. sees. 401-404.
2. United States v. Bekins (1938) 58 S. Ct. 811, 82 L. ed. 751.
3. (1936) 298 U. S. 513, 56 S. Ct. 892, 80 L. ed. 1309.
4. (1934) 48 Stat. 798, (1937) 11 U. S. C. A. secs. 301-303.
5. Black, Has Congress Circumvented the Ashton Decision? (1937) 23
A. B. A. J. 683.
6. Lindsay-Strathmore Irrigation Dist. v. Superior Ct. (1920) 182 Cal.
315, 187 Pac. 1056.
7. Claiborne County v. Brooks (1884) 111 U. S. 400, 4 S. Ct. 489, 28
L. ed 470; Railroad Commission v. Los Angeles R. Corp. (1929) 280 U. S.
145, 50 S. Ct. 71, 74 L. ed. 234.
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